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Victory for Billboard Control:
The Fourth Circuit Vacates and Remands Waynesville
by Thomas P. Cody
On April 11, 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit vacated and remanded Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v.
City of Waynesville. 1 The court held that a municipal ordinance
prohibiting new billboards and phasing out existing billboards
does not on its face affect a taking of property interests in
violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution. A regulatory taking may only be determined,
stated the court, after a detailed factual inquiry into a
specific claim. This decision is a victory for proponents of
2
billboard control.
Background of the Case
In November, 1985, the City of Waynesville, North Carolina,
passed a comprehensive sign ordinance under the city's general
zoning authority. 3 The ordinance restricts the number, size, and
spacing of all signs within the jurisdiction and prohibits the
installation of off-premise outdoor advertising signs

Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville,
No. 89-1005 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 1990).
2 The Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC), located in
Charlottesville, Virginia, and Chapel Hill, North Carolina, has
assisted the City of Waynesville throughout the defense of its
sign ordinance. SELC is a regional, non-profit, environmental
law firm which provides free legal assistance to communities and
environmental organizations working to improve the southern
environment in the areas of coastal and wetlands protection,
improvement of water quality, and protection of national forests,
scenic rivers, and other public lands. SELC has also devoted a
substantial amount of time to billboard and sign control.
1

3 Waynesville, N.C., Ordinance 24-85 (Nov. 26, 1985).
1

(billboards) .

The ordinance also requires the removal of all
nonconforming signs, including existing billboards, within four
5
years of passage of the ordinance.
In February, 1986, Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc.
(Georgia Outdoor), a billboard company operating in the
Waynesville area, brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina. 6 In November,
1986, District Court Judge David B. Sentelle granted summary
judgment in favor of Waynesville. Judge Sentelle held that the
fifth and fourteenth amendment takings claim was not ripe for
adjudication.
In November, 1987, the Fourth Circuit 7 affirmed the district
court's ruling on the first amendment claim, 8 finding it
consistent with its own prior decisions and those of the United

4

Id.

5

Id.

6 The suit alleged that the Waynesville ordinance violates
Georgia Outdoor's first amendment rights to free speech by
outlawing a protected form of expression, commercial off-premise
advertising; that the stated objectives of the ordinance, traffic
safety and aesthetics, are neither rationally related to nor
adequate to support the ordinance; that the ordinance violates
due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution; and that the ordinance
constitutes a taking of private property for public use without
just compensation, in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution.

7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
encompasses the states of Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia,
North Carolina, and South Carolina.
8 Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville,

833 F.2d 43

(4th Cir. 1987) (Waynesville I).
2

States Supreme Court. 9

The ordinance did not favor commercial
speech over noncommercial speech, and thus cured the infirmity
found in a San Diego ordinance challenged in Metromedia, Inc. v.
San Diego. 10 The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the district
court's finding that traffic safety and aesthetics are valid
justifications for the ordinance. 11 Finally, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision that the ordinance did not
violate fourteenth amendment due process merely because it
12
completely destroys some businesses.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, however, with the district
court's treatment of the fifth and fourteenth amendment takings
question. Writing for the court of appeals, Judge Widener stated
that the district court erred when it declined to reach this
issue:
The question of whether a particular zoning ordinance
is so onerous as to require just compensation under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal
constitution obviously presents a federal question, and
this question was properly before the district court.
Since the court had jurisdiction to hear that claim,
which was essentially related to the other claims of
the plaintiff in this case, it was improper to require
plaintiff to file another action solely to determine
See Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of
Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1986).
"The Supreme Court .
determined in Metromedia . . . that a city may justifiably
prohibit all off-premise signs or billboards for aesthetic and
9

safety reasons .

.

.

."

Id. at 1272.

10 453 U.S. 490

(1981).
The city's general ban on signs
carrying noncommercial advertising was invalid under the first
and fourteenth amendments because it was not a reasonable "time,
place and manner" restriction. Distinguishing on-site commercial
messages from off-site commercial messages did not justify
prohibiting the display of noncommercial messages. Id. at 491.
11 Waynesville I, 833 F.2d at 46. The court noted that in
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789 (1984), the Supreme Court held that aesthetics alone is a
sufficient justification for an exercise of the police power.
Id.
12

Id.

the taking or just compensation issue. The fact that
plaintiff may have a remedy in the state courts does
not excuse a federal court from deciding a case in
which it has jurisdiction. 3
The court remanded the case for consideration of the takings
claim.
On remand to the district court, both parties renewed their
motions for summary judgment. Judge Robert D. Potter, assigned
to the case in lieu of Judge Sentelle, granted summary judgment
for the plaintiff Georgia Outdoor and enjoined enforcement of the
14
ordinance, holding that it was unconstitutional as written.
Based on affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and depositions
that had been filed, Judge Potter made sixteen "findings of fact"
as to which no genuine issue of material fact existed. 15 These
findings were sufficient, in his opinion, to determine that the
ordinance takes all of Georgia Outdoor's property without just
16
compensation and is therefore unconstitutional on its face.
On April 11, 1990, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district
court's orders and remanded the case for a detailed factual
examination to determine whether the ordinance affects a taking
of Georgia Outdoor's property. 17 Consistent with the Fourth
Circuit's earlier decision in the case (Waynesville I), Judge
Widener wrote that, because the ordinance advances a legitimate
state interest, it is not facially unconstitutional.18 The
record was not sufficiently developed, however, to conduct the
13

Id. at 47.

14 Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of
Waynesville, 690 F. Supp. 452 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (Waynesville II).
15 Id. at 454-55.
16 Id. at 458.
17 Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of
Waynesville, No. 89-1005

(4th Cir. Apr. 11, 1990)

III).
18 Id.,

slip op. at 14-15.

(Waynesville

fact-specific inquiry that would be essential to a final
determination of Georgia Outdoor's claim, thus requiring remand
19
of the case.
The Fourth Circuit's "Taking" Analysis

The Fourth Circuit analyzed the fifth and fourteenth
amendment takings issue in two steps. First, the court briefly
examined whether the city had a legitimate interest in the
ordinance. 20 Waynesville clearly had such an interest, as the
court had already concluded in Waynesville 1.21 The court then
focused on the more important issue: Whether the ordinance denies
Georgia Outdoor economically viable use of its property. 22 The
court found its earlier decision in Naeqele Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. v. City of Durham23 to be controlling on this issue.
In Durham, the court remanded for a determination of the
maturity of the takings claim and for further factual

19

Id. 15-16.

20

Id. at 10.

The court restated the Supreme Court's rule

that a land use regulation can effect a taking if it "'does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests . . . or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land.'"
Keystone
Bituminous

Coal Ass'n v.

DeBenedictis, 480

U.S. 470,

485

(1987)

(quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
21 Waynesville III, No. 89-1005, slip op. at 10.
22

Id.

23 844 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1988).
Durham is factually
similar to Waynesville and Raleigh. The City of Durham adopted a
billboard ordinance which prohibits all commercial, off-premise
advertising signs except those along interstate or federallyaided primary highways. The ordinance provides a five and onehalf year amortization period for the removal of all nonconforming signs, which is substantially similar to the four year
amortization period adopted by Waynesville.
5

investigation should the claim be found ripe. 24 The required
factual development involves two inquiries. 25 First, the court
must determine the appropriate unit of the plaintiff's property
affected by the ordinance. 26 In the billboard context, this
includes examining the extent of the plaintiff's business and
determining whether removal of certain billboards affects the
27
marketability of billboards in other locations.
Second, the appropriate unit of property must be considered
in light of three factors enunciated in Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. New York City: "The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant .

.

. the extent to which the regulation has interfered

with distinct investment-backed expectations .

.

.

. [and) the

character of the governmental action."2 8 The court stated that a
full evidentiary hearing would be necessary, and that resolution
29
of the issue by summary judgment should be approached warily.
On remand, the district court was directed to make findings
pertaining to every aspect of Naegele's business that would be

24 Id. at 174-75.
The court discussed how recent Supreme
Court decisions such as Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988),
and Williamson Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985), require ad hoc factual inquiries to determine whether the
plaintiff's claim is mature.
25 Durham, 844 F.2d at 176.

26 Id. The court cited the Supreme Court's decisions in
Keystone and Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978), for the authority that its review should focus on the
nature of the interference with property rights in the parcel as
a whole and not merely on a discrete segment of the rights held.
27 Durham, 844 F.2d at 176.
Naegele argued that the Durham
regulations would adversely affect business outside of Durham
because of a "sharing" method of marketing. Id. This involves
sale of advertising at numerous locations for saturation of an
area and, presumably, a total return that is greater than the sum
of returns from individual billboards.
28

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.

29

Durham, 844 F.2d at 176-77.
6

30

affected by the ordinance.
With respect to the remand of Waynesville III, not all of
the Durham factors may be relevant.

For example, none of Georgia

Outdoor's billboards may be used for noncommercial advertising
since the Waynesville ordinance contains no exception for
noncommercial speech. 31 Most of the Durham factors are relevant,
however, and should be analyzed more completely on remand. 32
30

Id. at 178.

The

The specific factors include:

[T]he number of billboards that can be economically
used for noncommercial advertising, the number that are
economically useless, the terms of Naegele's leases for
billboard locations, the land Naegele owns for
locations and whether it has any other economic use,
the cost of billboards that cannot be used, the
depreciation taken on these billboards and their actual
life expectancy, the income expected during the grace
period, the salvage value of billboards that cannot be
used, the loss of sharing revenue, the percentage of
affected signs compared to the remaining signs in
Naegele's business unit, the relative value of affected
and remaining signs, whether the amortization period is
reasonable, and any other evidence presented by the
parties that the court deems relevant.
Id.
31

Waynesville III, No. 89-1005, slip op. at 11.

In

addition, Waynesville differs from Durham in that Georgia Outdoor
apparently does not own any of the land on which its billboards
are installed. Thus, subleasing and assignment should be
considered along with Georgia Outdoor's obligations to honor the
leases. Also, the "sharing revenue" factor may not be relevant
if Georgia Outdoor does no business outside of Waynesville. Id.
at 12.
32 Id. at 12-13. Another important issue that must be
reviewed on remand is the effect of section 136-131.1 of the
North Carolina General Statutes, requiring payment of cash
compensation for the forced removal of billboards along
interstate or federal aid primary highways. The statute was
enacted in compliance with the Federal Highway Beautification
Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(b) and (g), and will expire on June 30,
1994.
The takings analysis -- particularly consideration of the
percentage of affected signs within the business unit -- is
affected by the statute to the extent that Georgia Outdoor
retains billboards along these highways or is paid cash

district court's conclusions in Waynesville II are simply "too
imprecise to meet the standard the Supreme Court consistently has
emphasized
is so important in adjudicating claims of regulatory
,33
taking."

Amortization of Nonconforming Signs
An important part of the necessary factual inquiry is
determining how the amortization provision within the Waynesville
ordinance affects Georgia Outdoor's business.34

In Major Media

of the Southeast v. City of Raleigh, 35 the Fourth Circuit
considered an ordinance that severely restricts billboards and
contains a five and one-half year amortization period.

The court

affirmed summary judgment for the city because the plaintiff did
not present sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of
fact. 36

In Durham, the court considered a similar ordinance that

severely restricts billboards and contains a five and one-half
year amortization period.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated

the district court's entry of summary judgment for the city and
remanded for further proceedings because the plaintiff presented
genuine issues of material fact concerning the effect of the
ordinance on the plaintiff's business.

compensation for their removal through operation of the statute.
Id. at 13-14.
33

Id.

at 13.

34 Id. at 6-10.
The court defined an amortization
provision as a "period of time in which a new land use ordinance
will not be enforced, during which time a property user either
can make a use conform to the ordinance, or, if a user cannot or
chooses not to conform, during which a user can recover all or a
part of his investment before the use must be discontinued."
Id.
at 6.
35

792

36

Id. at

F.2d 1269
1274.

(4th Cir.

1986).

In Waynesville III, the court clarified its analysis of
amortization and found that a remand of the case is not
inconsistent with Raleigh or Durham. 37 The case falls under the
Durham rule precluding summary judgment for the city because
Georgia Outdoor has presented triable issues of fact. The court
concluded that the presence or absence of an amortization
provision is not dispositive of the ordinance's
constitutionality, but is merely one aspect of determining the
character of the government action:
Thus, the often-stated majority rule that "provisions
for the amortization of nonconforming uses are valid if
they are reasonable," in a sense both overstates and
understates the role of amortization. That is, because
an ordinance without such a provision may be
constitutional, in rare cases even the briefest
amortization period would not be unreasonable.
Conversely, because an ordinance could accomplish a
taking after the expiration of a very long amortization
period, in other rare cases an amortization provision
would not be reasonable. Therefore, amortization
38
periods cannot be viewed in isolation.
The analysis of amortization and the remand for additional
factual development thus renders the district court's analysis of
the takings issue incomplete. The district court placed great
weight on its finding that "[t]he ordinance eventually will
prevent Plaintiff and other billboard companies from operating
within the town's zoning jurisdiction."'39 The district court's
entry of summary judgment for Georgia Outdoor hinged on its
finding of an "eventual taking."
Under this flawed analysis,
additional factual development was not necessary because all
billboards would be banned at some point in the future.
In Waynesville III, the Fourth Circuit stated clearly that

37

Waynesville III, No. 89-1005, slip op. at 6-10.

38 Id. at 9-10 (quoting Annotation, Validity of Provisions
for Amortization of Nonconforming Uses, 22 A.L.R.3d 1134, 1139
(1968) (citation omitted)).
39

Waynesville II, 690 F. Supp. at 454.

amortization, along with numerous other facts, are relevant to
the question of whether Georgia Outdoor has lost all economically
viable use of its property due to the operation of the ordinance.
This is consistent with Durham, and echoes the Supreme Court's
preference for more intensive ad hoc factual inquiries when
analyzing takings claims. 0 The court quoted the Supreme Court's
decision in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County: "'[A]
court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone "too far"
unless it knows how far the regulation goes.

.

.

. This is a

question of degree -- and therefore cannot be disposed of by
general propositions.

'

41

The Future of Billboard Control in the Fourth Circuit
In the short term, Waynesville III is good news for the
proponents of billboard control. Affirmation of the district
court's finding in Waynesville II would have dealt a near-fatal
blow to the phasing out of existing billboards within the
jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit. Under Waynesville III, local
governments may restrict new billboard installation and phase out
existing billboards with carefully crafted ordinances. 42 Even if
the district court finds on remand that the Waynesville ordinance
affects an unconstitutional taking of Georgia Outdoor's property,
the holding will necessarily be limited to its facts. The

40
See D. Mandelker & W. Ewald, Street Graphics and the Law
161-77 (1988) (discussion of the constitutional review of the
amortization of nonconforming signs).

41 Waynesville III, No. 89-1005, slip op. at 15 (quoting
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348
(1986)).
42 For complete discussions of ordinances that pass
constitutional muster, see three publications of the Southern
Environmental Law Center, Charlottesville, Virginia: Visual
Pollution and Sign Control: A Legal Handbook on Billboard Reform
(1988); Visual Pollution and Billboard Reform in Tennessee
(1988); and A Road With a View: A Legal Handbook on Billboard
Reform in North Carolina (1989).

framework for takings analysis that was created in Durham and
affirmed in Waynesville III confirms that each sign ordinance
must be reviewed with respect to its specific factual context.
The extended future of billboard control in light of Durham
and Waynesville III is more troubling, however. Although ad hoc
factual inquiries have theoretical appeal, they may produce
inequitable results in practice. Almost all of the information
relevant to the Durham analysis is in the hands of the billboard
industry. 43 Although plaintiffs bear the initial burden of
proving the facts necessary to establish a taking, successful
defense of an ordinance will require extensive discovery on the
part of the local government. This will prove time-consuming and
costly, and may have a chilling effect on jurisdictions
contemplating such legislation. The Supreme Court's admonition
against resolution of takings claims with less than a thorough
factual analysis 44 cuts in two directions. Although summary
judgment for plaintiffs will be rare, 45 summary judgment for
defendants will also be infrequent because of the ease of raising
an issue of material fact. This suggests that local governments
should be prepared for lengthy battles to uphold their billboard
control ordinances.
Other aspects of this framework for takings analysis are
The Fourth Circuit did not directly address what
standards should be used when determining the appropriate unit of
property affected by the ordinance. Rather, the court jumped to
also troubling.

43
E.g., terms of billboard leases, cost of billboards that
cannot be used, depreciation taken on billboards, expected income
during the grace period, salvage value, loss of "sharing
revenue," and relative value of affected and remaining signs.

4

See Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988).

45 Summary judgment for plaintiffs will be limited to those
few instances where the ordinance does not even advance a
legitimate state interest and is therefore invalid on its face.

the application of the Penn Central factors.46 This ignores a
crucial question in Waynesville: Is it relevant that a sign
company has segmented its corporate structure, thereby enhancing
the takings posture of its interests within any one jurisdiction?
In Waynesville, Georgia Outdoor maintained that it did
business exclusively in the City of Waynesville, and that the
47
Waynesville ordinance affected a taking of its entire business.
The city alleged, however, that Georgia Outdoor may have been
part of a larger corporate structure consisting of other entities
in other jurisdictions.48 The existence of these corporate
relationships is relevant to the extent that regulation in
Waynesville may not affect a taking of the entire business
49
interest of George Allison, owner of Georgia Outdoor.
Determining the appropriate unit of the affected property
interest is crucial to such a flexible, fact-specific takings
analysis.
Conclusion
In Waynesville III, the most recent chapter in the history
of Georgia Outdoor Advertising's suit against the City of
Waynesville over its sign ordinance, the Fourth Circuit vacated
and remanded the district court's entry of summary judgment
against Waynesville. The decision is a victory for advocates of
billboard control. The decision is consistent with the Fourth
Circuit's earlier decisions in Raleigh and Durham, holding that
district courts must engage in an intensive factual investigation
46

Waynesville III, No. 89-1005, slip op. at 11.

47 Brief for Appellee at 31, Georgia Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. v. City of Waynesville, No. 89-1005 (4th Cir. Apr. 11,
1990).
48 Brief for Appellant at 7, Georgia Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. v. City of Waynesville, No. 89-1005 (4th Cir. Apr. 11,
1990).
49

Id.

when presented with a genuine issue of material fact in a takings
claim.

The decision is also consistent with the Supreme Court's

preference for ad hoc factual inquiries in the analysis of
takings claims.
For local governments and other proponents of billboard
control, however, the pattern of decisions in the Fourth Circuit
is cause for concern. The increasingly rigorous standard of
review being applied to sign control places a great burden on
local governments. This may discourage some cities and counties
from implementing ordinances restricting billboards. On the
other hand, one may argue that aggressive billboard control,
particularly the phasing out of existing billboard structures,
represents an unprecedented attack on the property interests of
an established industry and thus warrants more demanding
constitutional scrutiny. If WaVnesville I and Durham did not
clearly enunciate the type of factual inquiry necessary to assess
the constitutionality of ordinances phasing out existing
billboards in the Fourth Circuit, Waynesville III certainly
leaves no doubt for the future.

